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Abstract—In order to service an ever-growing base of legacy
electronics, both government and industry customers must turn
to third-party brokers for components in short supply or dis-
continued by the original manufacturer. Sourcing equipment
from a third party creates an opportunity for unscrupulous gray
market suppliers to insert counterfeit devices: failed, knock-off,
or otherwise inferior to the original product. This increases the
supplier’s profits at the expense of reduced performance/relia-
bility of the customer’s system. The most challenging class of
counterfeit devices to detect is recycled counterfeits: recovered
genuine devices which are re-sold as new. Such devices are
difficult to detect because they typically pass performance and
parametric tests but fail prematurely due to age-related wear.
To address the challenge of detecting recycled devices pre-
deployment, we develop Silicon Dating: a low-overhead classifier
for detecting recycled integrated circuits using Static Random-
Access Memory (SRAM) power-on states. Silicon Dating targets
devices with no known-new record or purpose-built anti-recycling
hardware. We observe that over time, software running on a
device imprints its unique data patterns into SRAM through
analog-domain changes; we measure the level and direction of
this change through SRAM power-on state statistics. In contrast
to highly symmetric power-on states produced by variation
during SRAM fabrication, we show that embedded software data
is generally highly asymmetric and that the degree of power-on
state asymmetry imprinted by software reveals device use. Using
empirical results from embedded benchmarks running on several
microcontrollers, we show that Silicon Dating identifies recycled
devices with 84.1% accuracy with no software-specific knowledge
and with 92.0% accuracy by incorporating software knowledge—
without prior device enrollment or modification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many electronics customers rely on third-party brokers in-
stead of Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to supply
components for a lower cost or shorter lead time. Sectors
such as defense or aerospace, which require supporting legacy
equipment expected to run for decades, are often forced to
depend on these ”gray market” suppliers to source components
discontinued or under-produced by the OEM [7], [34]. Third-
party suppliers add a weak link to the supply chain between
manufacturer and customer: unscrupulous brokers selling di-
rectly to the customer or further up in the supply chain have
an opportunity to increase profit margins by supplying inferior
devices and marking them as OEM-quality. Such counterfeit
devices are a growing threat to the electronics industry: one
2013 report estimated the cost of counterfeit electronics to
U.S.-based companies alone to be $7.5 billion per year [3].
Of the wide variety of counterfeit devices, including failed,
up-marked, and knock-off products, recycled components—
old but genuine devices salvaged from circuit boards and re-
sold as new—make up 80 to 90% of all counterfeits currently
in circulation [23]. Instead of out-of-spec operation, recycled
components threaten systems with early failure by working
long enough to pass functional testing and failing due to age
shortly after deployment. Depending on the end-application
for the component, premature failure can have expensive or
fatal consequences: known incidents of counterfeit devices in
safety-critical applications include automated medical equip-
ment and braking systems in high-speed trains [3]. These
systems are composed of multiple smaller discrete compo-
nents such as microcontrollers, sensors, and other application-
specific elements. Determining IC age informs the end-user’s
decision about the age of a larger system: fine-grain counterfeit
detection at the IC level propagates up to the system level.
The growing impact of recycled electronics has given rise
to several detection strategies. One set of approaches targets
future systems by designing in a “silicon odometer”, a circuit
that responds predictably to aging effects and reveals a device’s
operating time [1], [8], [11], [26], [47]. Hardware approaches
work when implemented by the OEM, but leave past and
presently-manufactured devices unserved; the vast majority of
ICs built today do not include aging-detection circuitry. To
avoid the design changes and die space overhead associated
with hardware solutions, enrollment-based approaches com-
bine an aging-sensitive metric with an aging-insensitive one,
which are both recorded at manufacture-time; suspect ICs are
identified by the age-insensitive metric, and a significant devia-
tion from the original age-sensitive measurement indicates the
device is recycled [12], [14]. However, enrollment techniques
are not available for older devices and require manufacturers to
maintain a device ID database. Other methods exist that avoid
designed-in hardware structures or pre-deployment enrollment,
but are limited in scalability and practicality because they are
destructive, time-intensive, and expensive [10], [16].
To enable high-confidence, non-destructive, recycled IC
detection without aging sensors or enrollment, we provide
Silicon Dating. Silicon Dating leverages five observations:
1) Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) underlies all
computing systems that we use: it exists on microcon-
trollers, Field-Programmable Gate Arrays, and desktop-
class processors.
2) SRAM’s tightly-cross-coupled construction filters-out
systematic variation sources like wafer-scale variation
and constant operational variation (e.g., ambient temper-
ature). This means that while individual SRAM power-
on states are non-deterministic (due to manufacturing-
and run-time chaos), SRAM memories as a whole look
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similar (in a statistical sense) across devices.
3) SRAM’s power-on state statistics (e.g., the proportion of
times a cell powers-on to 1), provides a digital window
into the analog-domain properties of a SRAM cell.
4) The analog-domain properties of an SRAM cell change
in a software-dependent manner as the device operates.
5) The values used by software are often asymmetric. In
bulk, we show a trend of 0-biased values across our
software benchmarks. In detail, we show that there exist
software-specific patterns where most SRAM cells hold
the same value throughout the lifetime of the program.
Putting these observations together: over time, software
asymmetries gradually burn-in to the SRAM, becoming
asymmetries in its analog-domain properties. This analog-
level change is measurable in the digital domain through
SRAM power-on state statistics. As a program runs on the
device, SRAM power-on states trend away from the expected
new distribution towards the biased data patterns inherent in
software. By measuring the degree of bias present in SRAM’s
power-on state, Silicon Dating estimates the age of the system.
To address cases where the auditor has partial knowledge
of the device under test and possible software (e.g., popular
legacy single-purpose systems), we demonstrate how to incor-
porate such knowledge into our program-unaware classifier to
create an increased accuracy program-aware version of Silicon
Dating.
We evaluate both the program-aware and program-agnostic
versions of Silicon Dating using a suite of five benchmarks
representative of common embedded software applications and
run them under accelerated-aging conditions on the Texas
Instruments MSP430G2553 [19]. Our evaluation shows that
the program-agnostic version correctly classifies 72.9% of 5-
month old devices and 84.1% of 5-year old devices, while
the program-aware version increases accuracy to 82.8% and
92.0%, respectively.
This paper makes the following technical contributions.
• We explore SRAM cell aging mechanisms and show
that typical software applications exercise these aging
mechanisms in consistent, predictable ways (III-A).
• We design a software system to determine the age of
currently deployed and future systems based on common
data biases that software imprints on SRAM in the form
of cell power-on state biases (IV-A).
• We extend our design with analysis of unique hardware
and software biases for the device under test; in this case,
we examine the specific aging behavior of the system to
produce a fine-grain estimate of device age (IV-B, IV-C).
• We implement this system on commodity devices and
show that it: (1) reliably detects up to 92.0% of recycled
devices (V-D), and (2) is robust to a variety of statistical
and physical noise sources (V-G, V-H).
• We evaluate the effects of natural and adversarial SRAM
recovery and show that reducing Silicon Dating’s accu-
racy by less than eight percent places a large time burden
on the attacker (V-I, V-J).
(a) A six-transistor SRAM cell. (b) MSP430G2553 SRAM power-on
state before aging.
Fig. 1: A single SRAM cell and whole-SRAM power-on state.
II. BACKGROUND
The typical implementation of SRAM, which makes up
main memory in embedded systems, caches in desktop-class
processors, and configuration memory in Field-Programmable
Gate Arrays, is two mutually reinforcing Complementary
Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor inverters as shown in Figure 1a.
These inverters form a bistable circuit where each state cor-
responds to a binary 1 or 0. The power-on state of each cell
is determined by a race condition between transistors M2 and
M4—as supply voltage increases, the transistor with the lower
threshold voltage Vth begins conducting earlier and drives the
cell into one of the two stable states. In contrast to Dynamic
RAM, the mutually reinforcing inverters mean SRAM retains
its state, without a refresh, as long as the cell is powered.
In a new device, Vth is determined by manufacture-time
processes that vary between each transistor causing a threshold
voltage mismatch between the devices. We identify three
distinct sources of Vth variation both within and across cells.
Structural variation: Design-time decisions such as wire
length or choice of SRAM generator produce broad,
family-level trends that are consistent and predictable
across devices. We explore this source of variation in
Section III-A.
Systematic variation: Manufacturing variation stemming
from wafer position or differences due to consistent op-
erational offsets cause Vth to vary. However, the tightly-
coupled nature of SRAM “filters out” this Vth variation
in individual SRAM cells, as both inverters are affected
equally. As a result, systematic variation has little impact
on the Vth mismatch within a cell, thus systematic vari-
ation has little influence on the SRAM power-on state
statistics across devices.
Chaotic variation: Local, transistor-scale physical pro-
cesses such as random dopant fluctuation [42] contribute
to Vth mismatch by introducing random differences in the
transistors within a cell. These random processes make
the Vth mismatch within an individual cell unpredictable.
When present, structural variation dominates Vth in most cells
and produces spatially correlated Vth mismatches; however, the
mismatch due to random variation in some cells is enough to
counteract the structural variation. Systematic variation affects
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all transistors in a cell equally and thus has little difference
on a cell’s Vth mismatch. We explore the interaction between
structural and random biases, and their effect on SRAM power-
on state, in Section III-A.
Threshold voltage differences between a cell’s inverters dic-
tate the power-on behavior of a cell; the larger the difference,
the more likely the cell is to power-on into the state associated
with the lower Vth inverter. For most SRAM-based memories,
most cells have relatively large Vth mismatches and are thus
“strongly biased” (i.e., they always power-on to the same
value). For the few that are weakly biased, the Vth mismatch
between inverters is small enough that operational noise during
the supply voltage ramp-up determines the cell’s power-on
state. We refer to the bias for a cell caused by manufacturing-
time Vth mismatch as hardware bias.
As devices age with use, transistor wear affects the Vth
mismatch; with enough Vth change, the effects are exposed
in the cell’s power-on state. The dominant aging effect in
SRAM is Bias Temperature Instability (BTI) [4], [28], [35],
[43], which increases Vth in the conducting (“on”) transistor.
Two forms of BTI affect SRAM cells: Positive BTI degrades
Vth of the conducting n-type MOS (grounding), while Negative
BTI (NBTI) degrades Vth of the conducting p-type MOS
(charging). NBTI is of the most interest as it has a larger effect
than PBTI and its net effect is to slow the 0 to 1 transition,
which is the key factor in determining who wins the power-on
race condition.
NBTI affects SRAM asymmetrically: when the SRAM
cell is in a stable state, only one inverter conducts and is
subjected to aging effects. As Vth rises for the transistor in
the conducting inverter, that inverter is less likely to “win” the
power-on race. Because the bit stored in the cell determines
the conducting inverter, aging is data-directed: a cell aged
holding a 1 value is more likely to power-on to a 0 on the
next power cycle, and vice versa. Past work demonstrates
SRAM’s susceptibility to adversarial, intentional asymmetric
aging by using it to clone or destroy SRAM PUFs [15], [37],
as well as recover secret keys [31]. This paper leverages
the software-directed aging that occurs naturally over a
device’s lifetime, referred to further as software bias, to
distinguish between new and recycled devices.
III. MOTIVATION
We exploit software-directed SRAM aging to detect recy-
cled devices without enrollment, modification, or destruction
by measuring the power-on state statistics of a device’s SRAM.
Three observations drive our approach: (1) SRAM’s power-on
state statistics are highly-regular across devices, (2) SRAM
power-on states change deterministically due to software-
directed aging, and (3) software has innate data asymmetries
that gradually imprint on SRAM’s analog domain, revealed
digitally through biases in SRAM’s power-on states. We exper-
imentally validate each of these observations before leveraging
them to design our recycled counterfeit device detector.
A. New SRAM is Regular and Predictable
The first observation behind our approach is that, unlike
individual cells, which are influenced by chaotic variation,
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Fig. 2: Distribution of cell biases in the baseline MSP430 set.
whole-SRAM power-on state statistics are very similar across
different devices of the same type. This makes sense when
considering that devices contain many thousand SRAM cells
that serve to average-out the effects of chaotic variation when
taken together. To quantitatively support this observation, we
measure the inter-device variation of whole-SRAM power-on
state statistics for three microcontrollers (details in Table I):
MSP430, MSP432, and EFM32. We choose these devices for
variety in both manufacturer (Texas Instruments manufactures
the MSP430 and MSP432, while Silicon Laboratories manu-
factures the EFM32) and processor (the MSP432 and EFM32
are ARM Cortex-based microcontrollers and the MSP430 uses
its own low-cost, low-power core), and because they are rep-
resent the most popular legacy and current microcontrollers.
We determine the bias of the cells in each device by
recording SRAM’s power-on state 51 times at 20°C. We select
20°C to limit the impact of thermal noise and aging on our
power-on state measurements. We use a large sample size to
reduce the impact of randomness on our measurements and
to get a fine-grain notion of each cell’s power-on probability.
Using an odd number of samples enables us to determine a
majority value for each cell.
We find that while the biases of individual cells are un-
predictable across devices in a design due to random chaotic
variation, the high-level representative statistics of new SRAM
are highly predictable. Table I shows several summary statis-
tics for the SRAM power-on states on each microcontroller.
We separate SRAM cells into one of three possible categories:
Strongly 1-biased: Cells that power-on to 1 every trial.
Strongly 0-biased: Cells that power-on to 0 every trial.
Weakly biased: Cells that power-on into both states over
the course of the trials, e.g., a cell powering-on into 0 40
times and 1 11 times.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of strong and weak cells in the
MSP430s. The power-on probability follows a symmetric U-
shaped distribution where the strongly-biased cells dominate.
For each new device within a each the same device type, the
portion of strongly 0- and 1-biased cells as well as the mean
bias of SRAM is consistent. Different designs have different
degrees of similarity between devices: the MSP432 devices
are highly regular, while the MSP430 and EFM32 vary more
3
Device MSP430G2553 [19] MSP432P401R [20] EFM32WG990F256 [25]
Manufacturer Texas Instruments Texas Instruments Silicon Labs
Core MSP430 ARM Cortex-M4 ARM Cortex-M4
SRAM Size (B) 512 64K 32K
Aging Acceleration Voltage, Temperature Temperature Temperature
Dev. Board Cost $9.99 $19.99 $99.99
Sample size 18 6 2
Statistic Mean Std. Dev. Rel. Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Rel. Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Rel. Std. Dev.
Mean bias 51.9% 1.5% 2.89% 49.5% 0.05% 0.11% 46.8% 0.69% 1.49%
Portion strong 88.4% 1.1% 1.24% 78.5% 0.76% 0.97% 77.5% 4.72% 6.09%
Portion weak 11.6% 1.1% 9.48% 21.5% 0.76% 3.54% 22.5% 4.72% 21.0%
Weak bias mean 49.9% 1.6% 3.14% 50.0% 0.06% 0.13% 53.2% 3.3% 6.12%
Portion strong 1 46.1% 1.2% 2.60% 38.8% 0.35% 0.89% 34.7% 3.93% 11.3%
Portion strong 0 42.3% 1.9% 4.49% 39.7% 0.42% 1.05% 42.9% 0.79% 1.84%
Spatial autocorrelation 0.243 0.057 24.3% 0.022 0.010 48.3% 0.0015 0.0066 435%
p-value* 0 0 - 0 0 - 0.001 0 0
TABLE I: SRAM power-on statistics for devices from three different microcontroller families. * p-value for spatial autocorrelation; Python 3.6.9 rounds
the p-value down to 0 for the MSP430 and MSP432.
Change Mean Std. Dev. Rel. Std. Dev p-value
Mean Bias 0.088 0.0004 0.5% 1.8E-19
Portion strong -1.08% 0.26% 23.7% 0.00023
Portion weak 1.08% 0.26% 23.7% 0.00044
Weak bias mean -0.026 0.020 24.1% 0.01625
Weak bias std. dev. 0.0047 0.0045 95.7% 0.00554
Portion strong 1 8.56% 0.20% 2.29% 1.8E-22
Portion strong 0 -9.64% 0.26% 2.70% 3.0E-16
TABLE II: Change in summary statistics after fully biased aging towards
1 on the MSP430G2553.
between devices.
We evaluate the effect of IC-level design choices on cell
biases in the form of spatial correlation, shown in Table I. We
calculate spatial autocorrelation using Moran’s I [33], [36] in
order to quantify patterns in cell biases like the alternating-
stripe pattern in Figure 1b. Moran’s I varies between -1 and
1, where values further from 0 imply a non-random spatial
pattern and the direction of the value indicates a negative
correlation or a positive correlation. A zero value indicates no
spatial autocorrelation: values are randomly spread throughout
the space. We quantify the strength of cell bias patterns caused
by design-time choices using Moran’s I and the p-value with
a random distribution null hypothesis for each device family
in Table I. Each device family tested contains a non-random
pattern in cell biases; however, the strength of the pattern
varies—spatial correlation is more evident in the MSP430 than
in the MSP432 or EFM32, as shown by the higher value for
Moran’s I. The more significant the spatial autocorrelation, the
more information it provides during classification, as discussed
in Section IV-B.
B. SRAM Aging is Regular and Predictable
The low deviation of the values in Table I enable an accurate
statistical model for new devices, but their value as indicators
of device age depends on both how they change with age and
the variation of that change between similarly-aged devices. To
quantify how the values in Table I change with age, we age the
embedded SRAM within a set of six MSP430G2553s for an
effective five years using the experimental setup described in
Section V. We choose the MSP430G2553s primarily because
they expose the unregulated SRAM supply voltage, which
enables us to observe the long-term effects of device aging
in a short time.1 Five years captures the majority of SRAM’s
change due to age: our evaluation in Sections V-B and V-G
indicates that change due to age follows a roughly logarithmic
trend and that most measurable change occurs in the first
3-4 months of use, consistent with trends observed in past
work [2], [29].
In order to determine how the data in a cell affects the
magnitude and direction of its aging, we age half of the devices
by writing all 1s to the SRAM and half of the devices writing
all 0s. Table II details the change in summary statistics we
observe in the devices aged with all 0s (i.e., all cells aged
towards a power-on state of 1). Note that the change in the
set of all-1 devices is similar, but in the opposite direction—
the bit stored in the cell determines the direction, but not the
magnitude, of the bias change. For each statistic, Table II also
includes p-values as calculated by Welch’s t-test [41] after the
observed change is applied to samples of the new distribution.
The null hypothesis is that the resulting statistical values are
samples of the new-device statistical distribution, i.e., the p-
value represents how likely it is to find a new device with
such a statistic, given the new device distribution for that
statistic. We use the p-value as a heuristic for the usefulness
of the statistic in classification (smaller is better, because it
indicates increased new and aged device separation). These
results reveal two key insights about SRAM aging:
SRAM aging is predictable: similar devices respond in
similar ways to age-based wear, which enables accurate
modeling of SRAM’s statistical changes as devices age.
SRAM aging is distinguishing: the change induced by
aging is much larger than the variation expected in new
devices, which creates a clear distinction between new
and used devices.
Because SRAM ages equally in either direction (towards 0
or 1), the primary factor in the rate of software burn-in is the
bias of the bit software writes to the cell. Unbiased bits that
spend roughly equal time containing as 0 or 1 do not change
SRAM power-on state statistics, as both inverters age equally
1We conduct aging experiments analogous the one presented in this section
using the MSP432P401R for two months (3.6 effective months given the 1.8x
acceleration factor provided by increasing temperature from 293 K to the max
operating temperature of 358 K). We observe similar cell bias shift trends in
both, but focus on the MSP430 to explore aging’s long-term effects.
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(a) PID bias (b) FFT bias
Fig. 3: Bit biases for the PID and FFT benchmarks. A darker square indicates
that bit spent more time as a 1; hatching indicates that memory location is
never written by the benchmark.
Benchmark SRAM Use (B) Avg. SW Bias Mean Strength
FFT 512 0.3074 0.6897
FSM Controller 468 0.0744 0.8687
FIR Filter 448 0.3356 0.3957
Quicksort 512 0.1995 0.7738
PID Controller 384 0.2190 0.6228
Average 0.2272 0.6701
TABLE III: Benchmarks that we use to test Silicon Dating.
and the Vth mismatch within the cell stays constant. Thus,
SRAM power-on states only reveal device age when software
uses the SRAM asymmetrically.
C. Software is Naturally Biased
Our second driving observation is that embedded software
intrinsically contains asymmetric data patterns. Specifically,
most memory cells spend more time holding a 0 rather than
a 1. We validate this claim using five embedded benchmarks
representing common software tasks, described in Table III.
We generate pseudorandom input data for each benchmark
using a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) [30] to ensure
biased input data does not affect the results.
We measure software asymmetry by running each bench-
mark in a modified version of the MSP430 simulator included
in the open source software MSPDebug [6] and track the por-
tion of total time each SRAM cell contains a certain value over
the course of a large number (10,000) of executions. Figure 3
illustrates the results for the PID and FFT benchmarks as
a heatmap of bit2 biases. Darker values indicate that the bit
spent more of the total benchmark time containing a 1. Across
10,000 executions of each of the five benchmarks, we find that
the mean bit bias is 0.227—that is, any given bit in program
memory spends on average 22.7% of the total execution time
containing a 1. Taken with the results of Section III-A that
SRAM ages towards powering-on as the inverse of its held
value, we observe that the number of cells biased towards
powering into the 1 state increases over time.
While mean bit bias describes the final state of the SRAM
given sufficient aging time, it does not accurately represent
2Throughout this paper we make a distinction between bit bias, the time-
averaged value of a software bit during execution, and cell bias, the proportion
power-ons a SRAM cell takes on a 1 value. For example, a bit with a bias of
0.8 holds 1 for 80% of execution time, while a cell with a bias of 0.8 powers
on to 1 in 80% of power-on trials.
the rate at which software burn-in occurs. For example, a
program in which 75% of bits always contain 1 and 25%
always contain 0 burns into SRAM faster than a program in
which all bits contain a 1 75% of the time and a 0 25% of
the time, despite both programs having the same mean bias
of 0.75. In order to better distinguish between programs that
age hardware at different rates, we quantify the bias strength
of a bit as Strength = 2 ∗ |B − 0.5|, where B is the bias of
the bit. We use bias strength as a predictor of how likely a
software bit is to change a cell’s power-on statistics (thereby
providing age information), and extend it to software in the
form of mean bit strength. We report the average bit strength
for each benchmark in Table III. The results indicate that
software includes sufficient strongly-biased bits to change cell
power-on states. Taken together, the mean bias and bit strength
quantify the magnitude, direction, and rate of software burn-
in.
IV. DESIGN
To leverage software’s distinctive, asymmetric aging effect
on SRAM as illustrated in Figure 4, we design Silicon Dating:
a tool that detects recycled computing devices. Silicon Dating
quantifies software-induced bias in SRAM’s power-on state
through whole-SRAM statistics. Silicon Dating then compares
the resulting bias to the expected statistical bias of a new
device; the degree of similarity determines whether the device
is classified as new or recycled.
We build Silicon Dating around the abstraction of a noisy in-
formation channel. We identify two noise sources: (1) SRAM
cell aging visibility (i.e., whether aging impacts an SRAM
cell sufficiently to change its power-on probability) and (2)
software bit bias (i.e., whether a bit holds a single value
the majority of the time). These noise sources serve to limit
the amount of information available through power-on state
measurements and are not under our control. We identify three
sources of information, each assuming a different amount of
software- and device-specific knowledge: (1) universal trends:
features that are consistent across software and devices (e.g.,
new device mean bias is 50%); (2) structure awareness:
whole-SRAM features seen across devices (of the same type)
(e.g., the MSP430 has an alternating 512-bit stripe pattern);
and (3) software awareness: software-specific features (e.g.,
the regions of strongly 1- and 0-biased bits near the bottom of
the FFT benchmark memory). By modulating access to these
information sources, we create use-case-specific expectations
for new and recycled devices. We then classify devices as new
or recycled using these expectations.
A. Zero-knowledge Classification
The most general use-case for Silicon Dating is when no
device- or software-specific information is available. In such
cases, the only sources of information to use in classifying a
device are general trends seen across devices and software. As
Section III shows, there are two general trends that we identify:
(1) embedded software is inherently biased towards 0 and (2)
SRAM embedded in new computing devices tends to have an
equal number of 0’s and 1’s in its power-on state. The first
trend forms our aged device expectation: we assume that all
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Fig. 4: Gradual software burn-in to hardware.
software bits stored in SRAM cells are 0; this means we expect
SRAM power-on states to age towards an increased number
of 1s. The second trend forms our new device expectation: we
assume an initial 50/50 balance of 1s and 0s in the whole-
SRAM power-on state. Thus, aging serves to push a device’s
power-on state from 50% 1s towards 100% 1s.
Based on the p-value heuristic shown in Table II, the best
potential metrics for detecting recycled devices in this scenario
are (1) the mean cell bias, (2) the count of strongly 0-
biased cells, and (3) the count of strongly 1-biased cells.3
Because strongly-biased cells dictate the mean bias,4 the
zero-knowledge classifier uses only the count of strongly-
biased 0 and 1 cells. Putting it all together, we expect the
average recycled device has significantly more strong-1 cells
and significantly fewer strong-0 cells than a new device. For
classification, Silicon Dating counts the strong-1 and strong-0
cells and generates a score S = count1− count0; if the score
is above a threshold value T , the device is marked as recycled.
B. Structure-aware Classification
While the zero-knowledge classifier leverages broad truths
about hardware and software biases, we observe that devices
of the same type are subject to structural variation that results
in biases in SRAM’s power-on state that span devices. We
leverage those cross-device biases to enhance Silicon Dating
through structural awareness. For example, any new SRAM
taken as a whole is characterized by a roughly even split of 0
and 1 cells, but asymmetries in the device’s design can result
in spatial locality (quantified by Moran’s I in Section III-A)
between cell power-on states. Take the MSP430G2553 shown
in Figure 1b; the structural bias is obvious in the alternating
512-cell bands of cells biased unexpectedly towards 0 or
1, compared to the 51.9% seen at the whole-SRAM level.
Quantitatively, we see that, for a given band, 68% of cells are
strongly-biased towards the majority value, 12% of cells are
3The statistics for weakly-biased cells remains evenly distributed around
50% before and after aging. This means that they do not add value as a
summary statistic for classification purposes. We explore how weakly-biased
cells reveal age through their location in Section IV-B.
4Strongly-biased cells make up the majority (81.5% on average between
families and 88.4% in the MSP430) of all cells and the mean bias of weakly-
biased cells is unchanged due to aging.
Fig. 5: Relationship between cell initial bias and bias after aging.
weakly-biased, and 20% of cells are strongly-biased towards
the minority value.
Next, consider the results of extreme software aging shown
in Figure 5. These results indicate that weakly-biased cells in
new devices are highly susceptible to aging and are very likely
to become strongly-biased cells in recycled devices. Quantita-
tively, 88% of weakly-biased cells in the new MSP430s that
we tested became strongly-biased cells in recycled devices, for
both software extremes. Notice that the number of weakly-
biased cells stays the same (at the whole-SRAM level); this is
because the weakly-biased cells that change to strongly-biased
cells are replaced by initially strongly-biased cells that become
weakly-biased cells.
At the band level we see a different trend: when you age
away from the majority value of a band, there are many
more cells that become weakly-biased cells, compared to aging
towards the majority value. Mathematically, this makes sense
as 68% of cells in a band are strongly-biased towards the
majority, while only 20% of the cell in a band are strongly-
biased towards the minority. Since 18% of initially strongly-
biased cells become weakly biased when aged against their
bias, aging away from the majority results in 12.2% of a
6
0 Majority Band 1 Majority Band
Expected
Actual 0 Weak 1 0 Weak 1
0 + - - + + -
1 - + + - - +
TABLE IV: Per-cell scoring chart, based on expected value (software-
dependent) vs. actual power-on value and strength.
band’s cells becoming weakly-biased, while aging towards the
majority results in 3.6% of a band’s cells becoming weakly-
biased. Thus, we make the high-level conclusion that aging
away from a biased region’s majority value increases the
number of weakly biased cells, while aging towards the
majority value decreases it.
Silicon Dating exploits this distinction to gain some infor-
mation from weakly-biased cells. Specifically, Silicon Dat-
ing considers a weakly-biased cell a match to the expected
value (given the corresponding software bit value) only if
it is in a band whose majority value is the opposite of the
expected value; otherwise, the weakly-biased cell is marked
as a disagreement. Table IV covers all cases of expected
value, band majority value, cell bias, cell value, and whether
Silicon Dating considers the combination to be a match or a
disagreement. The total score S for a devices is the number
of matches minus the number of disagreements across all
cells in the device’s SRAM: S = count+ − count−. Notice
that this algorithm naturally accounts for changes in structural
bias. As structural bias approaches 50% (i.e., none), the aging
towards and away from the majority values produces more
similar numbers of weakly-biased cells and the +s and −s
due to weakly-biased cells tends to cancel-out. This performs
similar to the zero-knowledge classifier, except there we ignore
weakly-biased cells, because they act as noise. As structural
bias increases towards 100%, there are no weakly-biased cells
created by aging towards the majority, hence no −s due
to weakly-biased cells; only +s are possible from weakly-
biased cells due to aging away from the majority. Thus, our
structural-aware classifier supplants the zero-knowledge
classifier—regardless of the magnitude of structural bias.
C. Software-aware Classification
While the zero-knowledge classifier leverages the broad
observation that embedded software tends to be 0 heavy,
software analysis provides an opportunity to exploit specific
insights about a given piece of software (or set of suspect
software). Silicon Dating uses software information in the
form of individual bit bias as discussed in Section III-C to
better inform the expected aged SRAM power-on distribution.
Software analysis improves Silicon Dating by replacing the
core assumption that software is generally biased towards
0 with the ground truth for the device running the known
software: which software bits are strongly biased towards 0
or towards 1, and which bits are weakly biased or never
written. Based on the individual bit bias for each benchmark
tested, we generate an expected power-on state distribution
for a device aged for infinite time with that software (i.e.,
the point when software bias completely dominates hardware
bias). The expected distribution for a given piece of software
corresponds to the inverse of the bias distribution shown in
Fig. 6: The experimental setup with aging control daughter board (top) and
the MSP430G2553 Launchpad (bottom).
Figure 3. For example, a software bit with a bias of 0—the
cell always contains a 0—causes that cell to have an expected
1-dominate power-on bias.
For the software-aware classifier, we separate software bits
into three bins, based on a bias strength threshold (as calcu-
lated in Section III-C): usable 1-biased, usable 0-biased, and
unusable. As discussed in Section III-C, only bits sufficiently
biased in one direction have the potential to change the
power-on probability of their associated SRAM cell. Choosing
which bits/cells to examine is a balancing act: including
weaker bits reduces the chance that the associated cell ages
enough to be detectable, while setting the threshold to be
too strict reduces the total information available to make the
classification decision. We explore the effect of varying the
software bit threshold on classification ability in Section V-E.
Silicon Dating also ignores cells the software does not write,
as these cells age in a software-independent manner. Silicon
Dating calculates a score for the device based on the remaining
cells using the rules in Table IV, using the same algorithm used
in structural-aware classification.5
D. Classification
The classification decision for a Device Under Test (DUT) is
based on the difference between its score at the time of testing
and the expected score for new devices. Because differences
in cell bias result from random physical process variations,
we model the possible scores for new devices as a normal
distribution with a mean and variance based on the statistics
in Table I. We consider the DUT recycled if its score is
beyond a decision threshold T number of standard deviations
greater than the expected score for new devices. The best
T is software-dependent, because different benchmarks have
different levels of score variation for new devices and different
levels of score change in aged devices. T is also application-
dependent based on the relative costs of false positives and
negatives; we explore this trade space for each configuration
of Silicon Dating throughout Section V.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate how effective Silicon Dating is at discrimi-
nating between new and recycled devices, we age a set of
5Structural and software awareness are orthogonal information sources.
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Fig. 7: Overview of the classifier evaluation pipeline.
microcontrollers using a benchmark set of common embedded
system programs. To take advantage of voltage-accelerated
aging, we evaluate Silicon Dating using a set of Texas Instru-
ments MSP430G2553s [19]. The MSP430G2553 is particu-
larly suited to accelerated aging because it exposes the unreg-
ulated supply voltage rail on a pin. MSP430-family devices
are also popular and commonly deployed in general-purpose
embedded applications, making them highly representative
of current commercial microcontrollers that counterfeiters
repackage and sell. We calculate the acceleration factor as
shown in Equation 1, using the following parameters.
AF =
(
Vstr
Vnom
)α
n
∗exp
(
Eaa
k
∗
(
1
Tstr
− 1
Tnom
)
∗ 1
n
)
(1)
• Gate voltage exponent α = 3.5
• Time exponent n = 0.25
• Apparent activation energy Eaa = −0.02eV
• Boltzmann’s constant k = 8.62 ∗ 10−5eV/K
• Nominal temperature Tnom = 293K
• Nominal voltage Vnom = 3.3V
• Stress temperature Tstr = 353K
• Stress voltage Vstr = 4.75V
This results in an acceleration factor of 280, i.e., one hour of
operation under the stress conditions ages the SRAM in the
same way as 280 hours of operation under nominal conditions.
We age each device under test for a total of 156 hours,
resulting in approximately 5 years of effective age. Because the
SRAM changes most during the initial aging period, we record
power-on states frequently at the beginning: at the (effective)
30 minute mark, followed by one hour, one day, one week, and
one month. After this initial period we reduce the measurement
frequency to once every 4.6 months (12 real hours).
We conduct all experiments in a TestEquity 123H Thermal
Chamber [40] to control ambient temperature and drive the
device’s supply voltage using a custom daughter board shown
in Figure 6. A microcontroller on the daughter board controls
a Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC) capable of powering
the MSP430 and transistors to isolate the MSP430 from
the debugger during high-voltage aging periods and power
cycles. To reduce the effects of thermal noise and minimize
device aging during measurement, we record all measurements
under the nominal operating conditions with an hour thermal-
stabilization period before and after the measurements.
A. Evaluation Methodology
We combine the analytical model of device aging we
develop in Section III-A with Monte Carlo [32] methods
to evaluate Silicon Dating with a large number of devices
without individually aging each one. Figure 7 gives a high-
level overview of our evaluation process. We first age five
devices, one running each benchmark described in Table III,
under accelerated-aging conditions and collect their SRAM
power-on distributions after each aging interval. To evaluate a
classifier, we create a set of new-device scores by running
the classifiers on the baseline set of 18 new devices used
to generate the results in Table I. According to the Shapiro-
Wilk [38] test with p = 0.05, the new-device scores for each
classifier are normally distributed, allowing us to generate
arbitrarily many virtual devices using the distribution from the
18 physical devices. Finally, we apply the incremental change
in score observed in the real devices at each time step to the
new-device scores to match the aging progression we observe
in the real devices and its effect on the classification score—
Figure 8 illustrates this aging progression on a set of 100
devices.
We first find the upper limit of Silicon Dating’s effectiveness
by applying the classifiers to the devices aged with fully-biased
software from Section III-A. We then evaluate Silicon Dating
in stages of increasing specificity:
1) In the first stage, we assume no special knowledge
of the software or hardware and evaluate classification
performance on devices running our five embedded
benchmarks.
2) We then evaluate the same devices but include hardware
structural bias information as described in Section IV-B,
which allows Silicon Dating to leverage weakly biased
cells during the scoring process.
3) Finally, we add software-specific information to down-
select useful bits and maximize the age information
available to Silicon Dating.
We use this evaluation process to answer several key questions
about Silicon Dating:
1) How well can Silicon Dating distinguish between new
and recycled devices after a typical aging period?
2) What is the minimum aging time required for Silicon
Dating to outperform a random classifier?
3) What factors affect Silicon Dating’s accuracy?
4) What is the cost for adversaries to evade Silicon Dating?
B. Bounding Software-directed Aging
To determine Silicon Dating’s best case performance, we an-
alyze the devices aged with fully-biased software in Section II.
The difference in score between devices aged with the same
software is minimal, reflecting our observation in Section III-A
that devices respond similarly to aging. We model the response
of 1000 devices to aging using the analytical method described
in Section V-A by applying the incremental change in score
observed in the real aged devices up to the 5 year mark (the
exact change modeled is a random sample from distribution
of observed aging-induced changes at that time step). This
effectively tests Silicon Dating with 2000 devices, half of
which are new and half of which are recycled.
Figure 8 shows the change in score for the devices over
time; we only plot 100 here for illustrative purposes. The
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Fig. 8: Score change over time of devices aged with fully-biased software.
Horizontal line indicates the cutoff for a perfect classification decision after
5 years of aging.
thicker horizontal line indicates the optimal cutoff T for
distinguishing between new and recycled devices after 5 years
of use. Devices with a score above this line are labeled as
recycled. For these devices Silicon Dating achieves a 96%
accurate classification rate after the first 4.6 month aging
period, which increases to 100% after the first 1.9 years of
aging. We explore the accuracy for shorter aging periods in
Section V-G. Given that electronic devices often have lifetimes
on the order of decades, this suggests that Silicon Dating
readily filters out counterfeit devices—in the extreme case.
C. Figures of Merit
We use several metrics to evaluate Silicon Dating’s binary
classifiers when a perfect decision threshold does not exist.
Silicon Dating classifies devices based on the difference be-
tween the score of a device under test and the mean expected
score of new devices by defining a maximum difference T
between the device score and the expected new score. If
scoredev − scorenew ≥ T , the device is marked as recycled.
T determines the diagnostic ability of the test: a high T tends
towards marking more devices as new (potentially increasing
false negative rate) while a low T tends towards marking more
devices as recycled (potentially increasing false positive rate).
To measure classifier ability we plot the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve [9], the True Positive Rate (TPR)
vs the False Positive Rate (FPR) as T varies, for each classifier
under various conditions. We vary the value of T for each
classifier to the point where every device tested is marked as
recycled (100% false positive rate) and where every device
is marked as new (100% false negative rate). For reference
we also plot the ROC curve for a random classifier, for which
TPR and FPR always increase at the same rate as T decreases.
The Area Under the ROC Curve (AUROC) enables numerical
comparison of classifiers and represents the probability that
the classifier will score a positive (recycled) device higher than
a negative (new) one; 1.0 corresponds to a perfect classifier,
while 0.5 is the AUROC for a random classifier.
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Fig. 9: Zero-knowledge and structure-aware classifier ROC curves for a
batch containing devices aged with all benchmarks.
Zero-knowledge Structure-aware
Benchmark AUROC TPR Acc. AUROC TPR Acc.
FFT 0.883 0.798 80.8% 0.879 0.793 80.6%
FSM 0.987 0.954 94.4% 0.991 0.962 95.3%
FIR 0.777 0.701 72.5% 0.854 0.835 79.1%
Quicksort 0.964 0.886 90.6% 0.955 0.853 89.0%
PID 0.850 0.770 77.0% 0.845 0.815 76.5%
Mean 0.892 0.822 79.3% 0.905 0.852 84.1%
TABLE V: Zero-knowledge and structure-aware classifier performance.
We consider the “best” T value to be the one that maximizes
Informedness [44] as calculated in Equation 2 and consider the
classifier accuracy at that point.
Informedness =
TP
TP + FN
+
TN
TN + FP
− 1 (2)
This choice of T reflects one implicit assumption: the cost
of a false positive is equal to the cost of a false negative
(i.e., wrongly rejecting a new device is as “bad” as wrongly
accepting a recycled one). In practice, false positives (returning
a good IC) are often highly preferred to false negatives (train
brake controller fails). The optimal T also depends on the
recycled device prevalence, where a stricter T detects more
recycled devices than it rejects new ones if the test batch
includes a large proportion of recycled devices. Thus T is
application specific.
D. Software-unaware Dating
We evaluate Silicon Dating for a large set of devices (1,000
new and 1,000 aged) using the analytical evaluation framework
described in Section V-A. Figure 9 shows the ROC curves
for the software-unaware classifier. To evaluate the effect of
structural bias awareness as described in Section IV-B, we plot
the ROC curves for software-unaware classification with and
without structural information. The dot on each line repre-
sents the optimal operating point using Equation 2. The per-
benchmark results in Table V show that the software-unaware
implementation of Silicon Dating is a reliable coarse-grain
indicator of device age, correctly classifying on average 79.3%
of devices under test. Leveraging the spatial autocorrelation
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Fig. 10: Software-aware classifier ROC curves for each benchmark.
Structure-unaware Structure-aware
Benchmark AUROC TPR Acc. AUROC TPR Acc.
FFT 0.968 0.900 91.2% 0.974 0.925 92.4%
FSM 0.994 0.972 95.8% 0.994 0.972 95.8%
FIR 0.941 0.850 87.4% 0.944 0.858 87.8%
Quicksort 0.991 0.955 95.5% 0.991 0.954 95.4%
PID 0.965 0.920 90.2% 0.954 0.889 88.9%
Mean 0.972 0.919 92.0% 0.971 0.920 92.1%
TABLE VI: Software-aware classifier performance with and without
structural information.
of cell biases increases Silicon Dating’s accuracy to 84.1% by
including weakly-biased cells in the classification.
While individual software dictates the degree of detectable
aging and therefore Silicon Dating’s overall performance, the
variety of different software in a test batch also impacts the
software-unaware classifier. Because each program produces
a different degree of burn-in to the hardware, the optimal
decision cutoff T is software-dependent. The best T for a
set of programs may not be the best T for any individual
program. For the software-unaware classifier, we choose the
best T on average as opposed to overfitting to any specific
benchmark. This results in a minor decrease in accuracy—the
structure-aware classifier’s “batch accuracy” considering all
benchmarks at once is 82.1%, compared to the 84.1% average
for individual benchmarks—but does not affect the AUROC.
E. Software-aware Dating
We evaluate the software-aware implementation of Silicon
Dating under the same conditions as the software-unaware
version. We also fine-tune the software-aware classifier’s per-
formance by varying the bias strength threshold required to
consider a software bit usable, and setting a benchmark-
specific score threshold for recycled device classification.
a) Software bit bias thresholds
Different software bits age their associated cells at rates
depending on their bias strength. The software-aware classifier
defines a minimum bias strength threshold and ignores cells
associated with bits below that threshold. Including weaker
bits increases the number of cells Silicon Dating examines,
but also decreases the chance that each bit produces a visible
change in cell bias. We evaluate the effect of different software
Benchmark SW 0 SW 1 Total
FFT 20.0% 1.4% 21.4%
FSM Controller 73.0% 0.6% 73.6%
FIR Filter 22.7% 1.1% 23.8%
Quicksort 55.1% 1.5% 56.6%
PID Controller 26.9% 0.9% 27.8%
Average 39.5% 1.1% 40.6%
TABLE VII: Portion of software bits usable by Silicon Dating’s software-
aware classification (where bits are “strong” if they are always the same value).
bias thresholds by varying the minimum bit strength required
for the classifier to factor the associated SRAM cell into
the scoring decision. Our results indicate that increasing the
minimum strength based on the bit-strength formula in Sec-
tion III-C from 0 (accepting all software bits) to 1 (accepting
only the most-biased software bits) increases classification per-
formance: the average AUROC and accuracy when accepting
all bits are 0.942 and 88.9%, respectively, which increase
to 0.972 and 92.0%, respectively, with the strictest software
bit threshold. We evaluate Silicon Dating’s software-aware
classifier using this strict bit threshold.
b) Decision Thresholds
The score change expected in an aged device is benchmark-
dependent: generally, software with more strongly biased bits
produces a larger score change in aged devices when compared
to new ones. The number of bits under consideration also
affects the score variation among new devices—introducing
more cells introduces more variation in the new-device pop-
ulation. Benchmark-specific threshold values affect the clas-
sifier’s accuracy, but not the ROC curve: switching from a
single threshold value to benchmark-specific ones increases
the software-aware classifier’s accuracy from 91.2% to 92.0%.
Figure 10 and Table VI illustrate our performance evaluation
for the software-aware classifier using the optimal parameters
discussed above. We make two observations about software-
aware classification based on these results.
First, software information significantly increases the clas-
sification performance of Silicon Dating by maximizing the
information available from each cell. The software-aware
classifier ignores weak bits and better leverages strong-1 bits
compared to the software-unaware classifier’s, which assumes
only strong-0 bits. Table VII illustrates the proportion of
SRAM containing usable bits in each benchmark using the
strictest possible software bit threshold. Because these strong
bits produce the most significant cell bias changes, Silicon
Dating is better at detecting devices running programs with
more usable bits (FSM) compared to those with fewer (FIR).
The count of usable bits in a program serves as a rough
predictor of Silicon Dating’s performance.
Second, structural information has little impact on software-
aware classification performance. Table VI shows that com-
bining structure-awareness and software-awareness has similar
performance to having software-awareness alone. These results
imply that unknown software bit bias, rather than SRAM
cell aging visibility, is the dominant noise source for Silicon
Dating.
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Fig. 11: Classification performance on the text benchmark.
F. Unbiased Software
Silicon Dating leverages a fundamental assumption about
software: software is more likely to write 0s to SRAM than
1s.6 We seek to explore the impact on Silicon Dating when
software violates this assumption. While Section III-C shows
that the assumption does hold for many software exemplars,
we identify two examples of programs that violate this as-
sumption: (1) text-based programs that employ a compact
encoding scheme and (2) cryptographic programs. We posit
that devices aged running software where a significant portion
of the workload is handling/creating this unbiased data are
more difficult to detect for Silicon Dating, because of two
reasons: (1) fewer SRAM cells contain software bits biased
enough to change the power-on state and (2) the software
values are symmetric in terms of the number of 0s and 1s
and will age the SRAM symmetrically.
To evaluate the impact of unbiased software on Silicon Dat-
ing, we evaluate an extreme case using a text-based benchmark
that fills the SRAM with ASCII (American Standard Code
for Information Interchange) characters based on their relative
frequency in English text. Compared to our five benchmarks,
the text benchmark has the fewest (13.1%) usable bits and the
mean bias closest to 50% at 35%. Silicon Dating’s classifica-
tion performance reflects these properties, shown in Figure 11.
The structural-aware classifier achieves 69.7% accuracy, while
the zero-knowledge and software-aware classifier both provide
63.6% accuracy.
Because most bits in the text benchmark are close to evenly
biased, we also evaluate the software-aware classifier with the
bias strength threshold as calculated in Section III-C reduced
from 100% (analyzing only bits that always contain a single
value) to 0% (analyzing all software bits). In this case, re-
ducing the strength threshold improves performance: the low-
threshold software-aware classifier is 68.9% accurate with a
ROC curve comparable to the structural-aware version. Given
the under-performance of the strict-threshold software-aware
6In actuality, Silicon Dating relies on bit value asymmetry (e.g., more 1s
than 0s), it does not matter what the dominant bit value is.
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Fig. 12: Fully-biased classification performance for short aging periods.
implementation compared to the software-unaware versions,
we observe that the software-aware classifier is superior to the
software-unaware versions when there are a sufficient number
of usably biased bits in the software under test.
G. Effect of Operating Time
Several additional factors beyond the behavior of Silicon
Dating itself affect the performance of both classifiers. The
first is operating time: older devices are easier to detect than
younger ones, as software has longer to burn into SRAM.
While increasing aging time makes the classification decision
easier, we find that the majority of detectable aging happens
early in the device’s life: over 60% of the total change in score
over the 5 year aging period occurs in the first 4.6 months.
After the first 4.6-month aging period the average AUROC
and accuracy for the software-aware classifier are 0.897 and
82.8% respectively, and 0.796 and 72.9% for the software-
unaware version. In the following aging periods, the AUROC
and accuracy for both versions slowly increase.
To determine the minimum aging time required for Silicon
Dating to detect a recycled device, we evaluate the devices
running fully-biased software at each of the short aging times
leading up to the first 4.6 months described in Section V.
Figure 12 illustrates the classification performance as a func-
tion of time; performance begins to increase after the first
week of use, reaching 64.9% after the first month of aging.
Based on the data shown in Figure 12, we estimate 1 month to
be the minimum operating time for Silicon Dating to achieve
better-than-random detection rates for devices running realistic
software. While Silicon Dating is less accurate for “younger”
devices, we note that such devices are also significantly less
likely to fail prematurely than the older devices Silicon Dating
reliably detects.
H. Effect of New-device Variance
Silicon Dating’s performance depends on software behavior
and the degree of SRAM burn-in, but also on the degree of
variability in the power-on SRAM state statistics of new de-
vices. Because aging affects each device similarly—the change
in age score is independent of a device’s bias when it was
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Baseline Original Low Variation High Variation
Mean bias σ* 0.015 0.007 0.0304
Portion strong 1 σ 1.2% 0.76% 3.0%
Portion strong 0 σ 1.9% 0.58% 3.3%
Zero-knowledge AUROC 0.892 0.990 0.738
Zero-knowledge accuracy 83.1% 96.7% 67.9%
Structure-aware AUROC 0.905 0.994 0.746
Structure-aware accuracy 84.1% 97.3% 68.4%
SW-aware AUROC 0.972 0.999 0.875
SW-aware accuracy 92.0% 98.9% 80.4%
TABLE VIII: Summary statistics and classifier performance for high and
low deviation baselines. * Standard deviation
new—Silicon Dating performs worse for device families with
high inter-device variance in SRAM power-on states (which
corresponds to higher variance in their age score). We measure
the impact this has on Silicon Dating’s classification ability
by down-selecting devices from the new device population to
form higher- and lower-variation sets and use those sets as
baselines to re-evaluate Silicon Dating.
Table VIII details the changes in summary statistic variation
as well as Silicon Dating’s performance using each baseline
set. The low-variance baseline predicts Silicon Dating’s classi-
fication performance for device families such as the MSP432,
which has lower variation between new devices (Table I)
than the set of MSP430s chosen for low variance. The high-
variation baseline evaluation highlights the advantage of using
software analysis to down-select bits in aging classification: a
baseline set that approximately doubles the standard deviations
of the summary statistics in Table VIII reduces both the
zero-knowledge and structure-aware classifiers’ AUROC and
accuracy by approximately 0.155 and 15.5%, respectively.
The software-aware classifier is more resilient to variance—
switching to the high-variation baseline reduces the software-
aware classifier’s AUROC and accuracy respectively by 0.097
and 11.6%, roughly 2/3 the performance loss of the software-
unaware classifiers. These results show that while both imple-
mentations of Silicon Dating work for high-variance baseline
populations, software-awareness further reduces its impact
and makes Silicon Dating applicable to a wider variety of
platforms.
I. Effect of Natural Vth Recovery
Transistors subjected to NBTI aging partially recover (i.e.,
their Vth falls) when the transistor is not conducting, but most
degradation is permanent [39]. Vth recovery is reflected in
SRAM power-on states as a return to the pre-age power-on
bias dictated by hardware variation instead of software bias,
reducing the measurable difference between recycled and new
devices and makes the classification decision harder. The most
common scenario where transistor recovery affects a device to
a significant degree is between uses: for example, a recovered
device is sold to a third-party broker where it sits unused for
a period of time before a customer buys it.
We measure the effect recovery has on Silicon Dating
by leaving the benchmark-aged devices unpowered at room
temperature for six weeks after the last aging period, then
measuring the power-on states and applying our classifiers to
the new data. Six weeks encompasses the majority of device
recovery, as recovery follows a logarithmic trend (i.e., almost
no additional recovery after 1 day) [37]. Our results show
that recovery has a minimal effect on Silicon Dating, reducing
accuracy by approximately 7% for all classifiers, with smaller
reductions in AUROC. These results indicate that the SRAM
aging effect measured by Silicon Dating acts as a lasting
marker of device age.
J. Adversarial Vth Recovery
While natural Vth recovery has a minor effect on Silicon
Dating, sufficiently motivated adversaries may manipulate the
SRAM aging effects Silicon Dating measures to obscure
recycled devices by aging SRAM cells back towards their
original power-on state. The counter-aging process would
mirror our own accelerated-aging procedure in Section V, but
with different bit biases to cancel out the naturally burnt-in
software biases. We identify several requirements for success-
ful counter-aging:
• The adversary must integrate the devices into a
counter-aging system: counter-aging requires character-
izing devices, developing counter-aging software, and
integrating each device into hardware to flash the software
and control aging. Adversaries must monitor the aging
process to ensure the accelerated-counter-aging procedure
does not damage the device, already worn from legitimate
field use, in a way detectable by functional tests. From
our own experiences on this project, this is challenging
and costly to scale to 100’s of devices.
• The adversary must be able to accelerate aging:
counteracting years of device age in a time-efficient
manner requires accelerating aging based on Equation 1
to bring the Vth of the relatively unused transistors in line
with the naturally aged ones.7 This makes counter-aging
devices with integrated voltage regulators impractical,
because they clamp the voltage seen by the SRAM
to a fixed level—eliminating the most powerful aging
accelerant. For example, counteracting 5 years of device
age at room temperature (20°C) on the MSP432 requires
approximately 2.8 years of running at the maximum
operating temperature of 85 °C. Even with unfettered
access to SRAM’s power rail, countering just the 5 years
of aging in our experiments requires the adversary to
spend 7 days counter-aging per device, 21 days for a
more realistic deployment of 15 years.
Sufficiently motivated malicious counterfeiters with the re-
quired resources can overcome the above barriers for thwarting
Silicon Dating, which only acts as a deterrent in these cases.
However, the majority of counterfeiters are profit-driven, not
target-driven: the costly time and infrastructure requirements
to counter-age devices serve as a strong disincentive to defeat-
ing Silicon Dating.
VI. RELATED WORK
Given the threat counterfeit devices pose to a variety of
areas, past work addresses recycled and other counterfeit IC
7While the naturally aged transistors experience some degree of Vth
recovery, the logarithmic nature of recovery means the counter-aged transistors
will recover approximately the same amount shortly after counter-aging: a
counterfeiter must produce similar amounts of permanent NBTI wear in each
transistor.
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detection using a wide range of approaches. In this section, we
divide the current body of research into four broad categories.
A. Physical Tests/Inspection
Many of the most widely deployed techniques capable of
detecting counterfeit electronics are physical tests in the form
of material analysis [17], [22] or inspections using techniques
such as Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) [10]. These
techniques capture a wide range of potential sources of IC fail-
ure and are often available as part of failure analysis labs [18].
However, physical testing suffers from several challenges that
limit its application in counterfeit detection. Simple external
tests such as blacktop or hermeticity testing are sensitive to
manufacturing defects typical of counterfeiting operations, but
fail to detect recycled ICs because such devices were built
to the OEM’s specifications. More effective techniques often
include destructive tests such as high temperature/humidity
testing [21] or IC delayering, which restricts the test to a small
sample portion of devices and reduces the likelihood of finding
a few counterfeit ICs within a larger set. Physical testing is
also normally performed by hand using expensive specialized
equipment, making large batch testing impractical.
B. Parametric Classification
Electrical parameter testing solves many of the problems
endemic to physical inspections because it can be automated;
electrical characteristics such as maximum frequency, oper-
ating current, and minimum voltage vary enough between
manufacturing processes to distinguish counterfeit from le-
gitimate devices. Counterfeit IC detection techniques based
on electrical parameters characterize new ICs and classify
devices under authentication as counterfeit if they do not fit
the known-good profile [16], [45], [46]. Parametric analysis
offers a low overhead, scalable solution for detecting out-of-
spec or up-marked counterfeit ICs, as a device can quickly
be characterized with several parametric measurements. How-
ever, parametric techniques are ill-suited for recycled IC
detection because they are highly sensitive to systematic
variation: frequency, power consumption, and other electrical
parameters vary significantly enough across new devices that
the parameters for aged devices are not statistically distinct
from new ones. For recycled microcontrollers, the best non-
destructive parametric approach has a correct classification rate
of 19.2% [16].
Of the different counterfeit detection strategies, Silicon
Dating is most comparable to parametric classification tech-
niques in terms of time and infrastructure overhead. The key
difference is that the tightly-coupled nature of SRAM cells
insulates the cell bias statistics from systematic variation by
treating it as common-mode noise within a cell. The primary
source of noise for Silicon Dating is random chaotic variation
between individual transistors, which is minimal compared to
the measurable change introduced by age.
C. Aging Detection Circuits
To address the challenges of recycled IC detection using
physical and parametric techniques, past work also explores
purpose-built aging-detection hardware. One solution is to
embed circuits into the IC that respond predictably to aging
effects and compare their behavior to a known new model.
Typical circuits used for these systems include fuses and anti-
fuses [5], [11], Schmitt-Triggers [27], and ring oscillators [8],
[24], [26], [47]. Purpose-built circuits enable high-confidence
detection of recycled devices even if the device under test has
only been used for a few days; ring-oscillator based systems
achieve >99% accuracy within a month of moderate use [11].
These systems typically target FPGAs because of the low cost
of adding aging-detection circuitry, but can be designed in
to other ICs where counterfeit recycling is expected to be a
problem. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any systems that
include aging-detection hardware, especially the older, discon-
tinued, designs at particular risk of counterfeiting. Thus aging-
detection hardware primarily targets future niche designs.
D. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
PUF-based solutions allow recycled IC detection without
additional hardware. Hardware-free PUFs for recycled IC
detection characterize a device’s SRAM by identifying aging-
insensitive cells to serve as a permanent ID and aging-
sensitive cells to indicate a device is recycled [13], [14], and
achieve detection rates similar to hardware solutions. However,
hardware-free anti-counterfeiting PUFs ultimately suffer from
the same limitations hardware-based solutions do: they do
not address old devices or those built without counterfeit
protection in mind, and come with the additional burden of
device enrollment, tracking, and protection of the device ID.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our evaluation of commercial microcontrollers running
common embedded workloads highlights the predictable im-
pact of software on SRAM’s analog properties. Silicon Dating
exploits the combination of asymmetric software data and
software-directed aging of SRAM to make a classifier that
accurately discriminates between new and recycled devices.
Our experimental results show that Silicon Dating is effective
at identifying even lightly used devices, is robust to both
common noise sources, and imposes an impractically high bar
for an adversary who attempts to reverse SRAM aging.
Silicon Dating measures the predictable consequences of
widespread trends in both hardware and software design to
answer the question: how can we reliably detect recycled
devices that were not designed with counterfeit-prevention in
mind? Silicon Dating is low-cost, as it uses easily measurable
digital-domain channels to reveal analog-domain changes, and
expandable, as it uses application-specific information about
both the hardware and software to refine the aging model and
maximize the information revealed by a device under test.
Our results motivate a new approach to broadly-applicable
counterfeit detection techniques based on modeling hardware’s
natural change over time, driven by its typical use case.
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